This provision to retaliate and the rules for doing so involve an apparent procedural dilemma as well as some peculiar economic features. Now is the time to reconsider those features of the rules, because the DSU has been under review as part of the Uruguay Round's built-in agenda and is now also part of the multilateral trade 1 Jackson (1998, p.176) went so far as to claim that the establishment of the Dispute Settlement Body in the WTO "is likely to be seen in the future as one of the most important, and perhaps even watershed, developments of international economic relations in the twentieth century". 2 There were no GATT-authorized retaliatory measures imposed during the 47 years prior to the formation of the WTO in 1995. In the one case where it was authorized, for the Netherlands in 1952, the authorized quota was never put in place (Valles and The present paper discusses first the apparent dilemma in the procedure for triggering the retaliation process, then asks why compensation is not preferred to retaliation, and then examines five economic features of retaliation. Those features are the concept of equivalence, the inherent injustices that remain, the choice of counterfactual to the WTO-inconsistent regime, the appropriate breadth of coverage in the damage calculations, and the cross-retaliation issue. The paper then points to the complications that globalization is adding to trade dispute resolution. Some implications for reforming the WTO's dispute settlement procedures are drawn out in the final section.
The problem with the triggering process
If a WTO dispute settlement Panel or the WTO Appellate Body finds a member's trade policy to be not in conformity with WTO rules and the member's commitments, a 'reasonable period of time' is allowed for the policy to be brought into conformity (DSU Article 21.3). In practice this period has ranged from three to 15 months. If the policy is not changed, consultations between the complainant and respondent members should begin before that time period expires, with a view to establishing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory agreement is reached within 20 days after expiry of the 'reasonable period of time', the complainant(s) can request authorization from the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to 'suspend concessions', that is, to retaliate (DSU Article 22.2).
Unless there is a consensus not to, the DSB will grant that authority, and within 30 days after expiry of the reasonable period of time. Should the respondent object to the amount of retaliation proposed by the complainant, the matter is referred to an Arbitrator for a decision within 60 days after expiry of the reasonable period of time (DSU Article 22.6). The task of the Arbitrator (where possible the original Panel that ruled on the WTO inconsistency in the first place) is to decide whether the level of retaliation proposed is 'equivalent' to the level of damage ('nullification or impairment'). That decision by the Arbitrator is final: there is no appeal option or opportunity to seek a second arbitration. The DSU will accept the decision and grant authorization for retaliation, again unless there is a consensus not to (DSU Article
22.7).
Straightforward as that procedure may seem, it hides an apparent dilemma in the DSU. Suppose the respondent takes the full 'reasonable period of time' before announcing a reform of the offending policy measure. If the complainant believes the reform is insufficient to make the policy WTO consistent, it has the opportunity to Clearly that possibility of very prolonged resolution could be tightened up through a re-drafting of the procedural rules when the DSU is reviewed. Hence attention now turns to the economic features of compensation and retaliation in cases where a policy measure has been found to be still WTO-inconsistent.
Why is compensation not preferred to retaliation?
A complainant unhappy with the respondent's policy reform is entitled to seek compensation until satisfactory reforms are implemented. If that compensation comes in the form of a temporary lowering of the respondent's import barriers on some other products, the changes must be consistent with existing agreements. In particular, they must be offered on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis.
In pure economic terms, compensation in this form is simply trade liberalization. That boosts economic welfare in the respondent country, in the complainant country, and even in third countries that export the products whose import barriers have been lowered. Even if some third countries that import those or like products were to lose from a terms of trade deterioration, we know from standard gains-from-trade theory that the world as a whole will be better off economically.
Why, then, is compensation rarely preferred to retaliation, when the latter typically involves the complainant raising its import barriers on products exported by the respondent and thereby harming economic welfare in both countries and globally?
The answer has at least three parts. First, for reasons discussed in the previous section, the current procedures do not guarantee a timely arbitration decision on the extent of compensation that is warranted. Hopefully that will not be an issue if/when the procedural rules in Articles 21.5 and 22.6 of the DSU are amended following the review currently under way.
Second, the MFN feature of compensation means third countries also could export more to the respondent, so the complainant would require a larger degree of access than if access were able to be provided on a preferential basis. Even though that greater openness would improve economic welfare for the respondent country, the political economy of trade policy is such that the political leadership of the country would lose from such unilateral reform -otherwise it would not have those import barriers there in the first place (Grossman and Helpman 1994). This is not to say that retaliation is desirable from the complainant's viewpoint. On the contrary, it is a last-resort action with peculiar economic features, five of which are considered below.
Five features of the economics of trade retaliation (a) The concept of equivalence
As noted above, DSU Article 22.7 requires the Arbitrator to determine whether the level of retaliation for which authorization is being sought is 'equivalent' to the damage caused by the WTO-inconsistent measure. The type of retaliation most commonly considered involves the complainant listing a range of products it imports 5 The fact that bilateral and multilateral agreements to lower import barriers are reached does not contradict the fact that governments are unwilling to liberalize unilaterally. Those agreements can be seen as a form of political gain from exchange in market access: Country A allows more of B's exports into A's market on the condition that B allows sufficiently greater access to its market for A's exports that the leadership in each country gains at least as much extra political support from its exporters (and consumers) as it loses from its import-competing producers who are exposed to greater competition from abroad (Grossman and Helpman 1995; Hillman and Moser 1995) . from the respondent on which it will impose prohibitively high tariffs until the respondent's offending measures are brought into conformity. The gross value of the imports to be prohibited, typically the average for the three most recent representative years for which import data are available, should match the value of the complainant's imports excluded by the respondent's WTO-inconsistent measure. That is probably the simplest way of quantifying the on-going damage to the complainant from the WTO-inconsistent part of the respondent's policy measure when that measure is an excessive import restriction.
However, it needs to be recognized that ensuring equivalence between the damage and the retaliation in terms of the gross value of trade between the respondent and the complainant does not mean that retaliation has the same economic welfare effect on the respondent as the initial damage is having on the complainant. The bilateral trade value necessarily exaggerates the negative effect on both parties' economic welfare, but it does not do so equally (except by coincidence).
To see this, consider the case of retaliation depicted in Figure 1 . Suppose D c is the complainant's import demand curve for a product imported from the respondent, and D w is the world's import demand for it. If S r is the respondent's excess supply curve for that product, then in the absence of distortions and assuming perfect competition, the international price of the product will be P and the quantity traded will by Q w , of which Q c goes to the complainant. A prohibitive tariff which reduces Q c to zero will cause the global demand for the respondent's exported product to shrink to D w '. This horizontal shift will be by less than the full extent of D c because the complainant will demand more close substitutes in the world market, driving up their price and hence shifting out to some extent the demand curve of the rest of the world for the respondent's export product. The international price of that product will fall to P' and the volume of the respondent's exports will fall from Q w to Q w ', that is, by less than OQ c . The gross value of the imports to be prohibited is the area PbQ c O, whereas the respondent's net loss of export earnings from this product is the smaller area PeQ w Q w 'dP'. Meanwhile, the respondent's economic welfare loss because of that trade prohibition is just area PedP', since the area under the respondent's export supply curve between points d and e represents costs of production which would not be borne if the respondent's export volume was reduced by Q w 'Q w .
The economic welfare loss to the respondent is larger absolutely, and relative to the gross value of trade curtailed, the steeper (i.e., the less price elastic) is S r , the respondent's export supply curve, between the free market equilibrium point e and the constrained equilibrium point d. Hence the ratio of PedP' to PbQ c O would vary across products. This underscores the point that ensuring the reduction in the value of imports from the respondent, due to retaliation, matches the reduction in the value of imports from the complainant, due to the WTO-inconsistent measure being used by the respondent, will not be (except by coincidence) the same as ensuring equivalent losses in economic welfare for the other party due to the import restriction each is imposing.
Moreover, this retaliation is not costless to the complainant: it loses area abP in Figure 1 from choosing to forego purchasing those import products from the respondent. That economic welfare cost is smaller the flatter (or more price elastic, e.g. because of the availability of close substitutes) is D c , the complainant's import demand curve for the respondent's export product, to the left of b. It is also offset somewhat by the gains from trading more with suppliers of close substitutes to the respondent's products (not shown in Figure 1 ) -although that necessarily is smaller than area abP, for otherwise the complainant would have been purchasing from those other supplying countries in the first place.
Although political sensitivity is likely to be the main criterion for selecting products to target, the net economic cost of retaliating to the complainant relative to the respondent would be lower the lower the listed products' export supply elasticity between e and d and the higher the complainant's import demand elasticity between a and b, ceteris paribus. That is, there is scope for the complainant to minimize its economic welfare loss from retaliating, just as there is scope for the respondent to mitigate its lost sales through diverting them to other countries. 6 For all these reasons, trade loss equivalence would never translate into equivalent damage to economic welfare, except by coincidence -and necessarily the complainant will in addition lose economically during the retaliation period from the import restrictions it imposes on the respondent's trade.
More fundamentally, why does the DSU seek 'equivalence' anyway? On the one hand, the idea of legitimizing retaliation is contrary to the objective of reducing impediments to trade. On the other hand, if the purpose of the retaliation is to induce swift WTO compliance from the respondent, then perhaps some multiple of the damage is the optimal level of retaliation to impose. Even the possibility that some multiple of the damage might be authorized would reduce the tendency for members to persist with WTO-inconsistent policies. From an economic viewpoint this raises two puzzles. First, why are services or TRIPs so finely subdivided when their trade importance is so much less than goods, which are treated as a single category? 10 Cases in point are the EC banana import regime arbitrations, whereby Ecuador was considered able to retaliate for loss of goods trade in the total value of bananas up to the f.o.b point while the United States was not considered able to retaliate for loss of, say, fertilizer trade to Ecuador even though that fertilizer may have been used in producing Ecuadorian bananas that could have been sold to the EC. See WTO (1999a, para. 6.12) and WTO (2000).
And second, why not allow the possibility of cross-retaliation so as to maximize the opportunity to encourage policy reform by the respondent, and to minimize the limitation that within-sector retaliation poses where the economies of the two parties are vastly different in size?
While there are strict conditions attached to cross-retaliation, that possibility is not completely ruled out. The conditions under which it is allowed are laid out in DSU Article 22.3. And already it has been used: in the case of the EC banana import regime, it was recognized by the Arbitrator that Ecuador imported too few goods from the EC to be able to retaliate in just goods, or even goods plus services, and so a suspension of concessions relating to TRIPS was allowed 11 (WTO 2000) . are many such host countries, there is likely to be less interest taken by any one of them.
Implications of globalization for trade dispute settlement
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Globalization and the growth of MNCs also is generating an ever-finer fragmentation of production processes that seek out the ever-changing lowest cost locations globally. A growing share of the intermediate inputs and value added by those plants is sourced from abroad (Feenstra 1998) . Hence even if a product undergoes sufficient transformation to alter its customs classification, the vast majority of its value could be due to the productive activities of another country. The convention that the host country has 100 per cent of the right to retaliate against another country's WTO-inconsistent policy while the input-supplying country has no right to retaliate is looking increasingly inappropriate as this aspect of globalization proceeds.
Scope for reforming the DSU
The most obvious implication to come out of WTO arbitration so far is the need to tighten current procedural rules in Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU. The problem is now well recognized and alternative procedures are under consideration.
Even with those sequencing uncertainties removed, however, it is unlikely that compensation will be preferred to the economically less efficient temporary measure of retaliation to entice a respondent to bring its trade regime into line with WTO obligations, for the political economy reasons mentioned in section 2.
The economic purist might wonder why the value of imports curtailed, rather than a valuation of the national economic welfare consequences of the import barriers, is used to determine equivalence in retaliation to nullification or impairment. The reason probably has much less to do with an understanding of economics than with the relative simplicity of the traditional concept of trade equivalence.
Meanwhile, the ethicist might wonder why the present peculiar concept of equivalence is adhered to during the dispute settlement period. One reason to question it is that a greater dose of retaliation could speed the process of becoming compliantthe apparent objective of the drafters of the DSU.
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A second equity concern is that retaliation does not help the complainant's exporters who have been and continue to be harmed, nor are the respondent's industries harmed by the retaliation the same ones that have been helped by the WTOinconsistent measure. Monetary compensation to the complainant from the respondent may offer more scope for governments to target the transfers to achieve a moreequitable outcome (and in the process to capture at least the full historical cost of the WTO-inconsistent measure to the complainant, if not also to add a punitive element).
And a third equity concern is that small complainants are not as able as large ones to inflict damage on large respondents. For that reason Horn and Mavroidis (1999, page 22) suggest consideration be given to the notion that the rest of the WTO membership contribute to the cost of small countries taking retaliatory action, so as to reduce the risk of large traders remaining WTO-inconsistent. This is part of the bigger issue of technical and financial assistance for developing countries to participate in the DSU more broadly, and indeed in all of the WTO's activities. 
